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The many meanings of evidence: a
comparative analysis of the forms and
roles of evidence within three health
policy processes in Cambodia
Helen Walls1*, Marco Liverani1, Kannarath Chheng2 and Justin Parkhurst3
Abstract
Background: Discussions within the health community routinely emphasise the importance of evidence in informing
policy formulation and implementation. Much of the support for the evidence-based policy movement draws from
concern that policy decisions are often based on inadequate engagement with high-quality evidence. In many such
discussions, evidence is treated as differing only in quality, and assumed to improve decisions if it can only be used
more. In contrast, political science scholars have described this as an overly simplistic view of the policy-making
process, noting that research ‘use’ can mean a variety of things and relies on nuanced aspects of political systems. An
approach more in recognition of how policy-making systems operate in practice can be to consider how institutions
and ideas influence which pieces of evidence appear to be relevant for, and are used within, different policy processes.
Methods: Drawing on in-depth interviews undertaken in 2015–2016 with key health sector stakeholders in Cambodia,
we investigate the evidence perceived to be relevant to policy decisions for three contrasting health policy examples,
namely tobacco control, HIV/AIDS and performance-based salary incentives. These cases allow us to examine the ways
that policy-relevant evidence may differ given the framing of the issue and the broader institutional context in which
evidence is considered.
Results: The three health issues show few similarities in how pieces of evidence were used in various aspects
of policy-making, despite all being discussed within a broad policy environment in which evidence-based policy-making
is rhetorically championed. Instead, we find that evidence use can be better understood by mapping how these health
policy issues differ in terms of the issue characteristics, and also in terms of the stakeholders structurally established as
having a dominant influence for each issue. Both of these have important implications for evidence use. Contrasting
concerns of key stakeholders meant that evidence related to differing issues could be understood in terms of how it was
relevant to policy. The stakeholders involved, however, could further be seen to possess differing logics about
how to go about achieving their various outcomes – logics that could further help explain the differences seen
in evidence utilisation.
Conclusion: A comparative approach reiterates that evidence is not a uniform concept for which more is obviously
better, but rather illustrates how different constructions and pieces of evidence become relevant in relation to the
features of specific health policy decisions. An institutional approach that considers the structural position of
stakeholders with differing core goals or objectives, as well as their logics related to evidence utilisation, can
further help to understand some of the complexities of evidence use in health policy-making.
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Background
It is widely agreed, including within the global health
community, that data and evidence are essential to
inform policy formulation and implementation [1–4].
However, the rhetoric of evidence-based policy – one
based on the assumption that research is objective or
unbiased and its uptake is a priori positive, with particular
emphasis given to pieces of evidence classified at the top
of so-called ‘hierarchies of evidence’ – has long been
critiqued by social science scholars (c.f. [5–16]). For
example, Weiss [17] has argued that research alone “is
almost never convincing or comprehensive enough to be the
sole source of political advice”, and “there are always issues
that research doesn’t cover”. Increasingly, policy-studies
scholars have explored aspects of the political system that
may shape when, how and the types of evidence used
within policy-making [7]. These can include both how
political institutions (such as formal structures, and less
formal rules and norms) [18] and how key ideas (including
the way that issues are framed and understood) influence
which types of evidence appear to be relevant for, and are
used within, different policy processes [13, 19, 20].
However, as described by Oliver et al. [5], little empirical
analysis has been undertaken of the processes or impact
of evidence use in policy and the way that research and
policy processes interact. This paper seeks to help address
this gap through a comparative examination of the role
that institutional and ideational factors play in shaping
evidence use for three contrasting health policy decisions
within a single country context. Specifically, this paper
presents findings from research conducted in Cambodia,
where the Ministry of Health (MoH), like many govern-
ment departments in countries elsewhere [21–23], has
explicitly embraced the overarching language of using
‘evidence-based’ approaches to health policy-making. One
example of this endorsement is in the country’s second
Health Strategic Plan (2008–2015), which defines prior-
ities and goals for the entire health sector, highlighting the
need “to strengthen and invest in health information
system and health research for evidence-based policymaking,
planning, monitoring performance and evaluation” [24]. In
this context, our study aimed to examine and compare the
ways evidence was discussed or used in three contrasting
health policy areas, namely tobacco control, HIV/AIDS
and performance-based financing (PBF). With regards to
PBF, we focus on a widely-praised government midwifery
incentive scheme (GMIS) that was introduced to increase
deliveries at public health facilities.
Tobacco control represents a policy decision for which
there is a long history of acknowledged corporate and
governmental financial interests that have often
attempted to influence how health-related evidence is
used in regulatory policy-making [25–28]. HIV/AIDS,
on the other hand, is an issue with strong donor and
global interest, and which has seen policy ideas particu-
larly shaped by global civil society movements and
consensus [20, 29–31]. Finally, PBF tends to have much
less external contestation or debate, but is largely seen
as a more technical matter related to health economics,
health service provision or health systems functioning
[32, 33]. As such, these three examples provide useful
ways to reflect on how the different institutional settings
in which policy-making takes place may influence
evidence use, including how interests and ideas of key
actors within the differing institutional arrangements
play out in relation to evidence utilisation.
Methods
The paper draws on findings from semi-structured, in-
depth interviews (IDIs) conducted in Cambodia in 2015
and 2016 with stakeholders from key health sector orga-
nisations, as well as a related documentary analysis. The
interviews were undertaken as part of a wider research
project examining political aspects of evidence use for
health policy-making in multiple countries. In case-
study countries, key informants were first asked ques-
tions about the systems and processes through which
evidence was used to inform health policy broadly,
followed by asking for multiple examples of recent
health policy decisions that could be illustrative of differ-
ent aspects of evidence use. In all countries, we subse-
quently investigated evidence use within tobacco control
policy – given the importance of tobacco use for health
in virtually every country context, as well as the exist-
ence of both a well-established evidence base and a
global policy framework (i.e. WHO’s Global Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)). After consult-
ation with local stakeholders, we then selected additional
country-specific health policy decisions of interest or
importance to enable comparative analysis. As noted
earlier, this approach led to the selection of three
examples in Cambodia, namely tobacco control, HIV/
AIDS and PBF.
Key participants were identified though purposive and
snowball sampling strategies. In line with our approach,
we first approached high-level policy-makers likely to be
knowledgeable about major policy developments across
the entire health sector, and who could thus provide a
general overview of the systems and structures in place to
use evidence and advise on the selection of case studies.
Subsequently, a scoping review of relevant documents (i.e.
published studies and grey literature in the public domain
such as policy documents and reports) was conducted to
collect background information on each policy issue. This
was followed by identification of individuals who could
comment further on the use of evidence to inform the
selected policy decision. We endeavoured to conduct
interviews with people who represented a diverse range of
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perspectives for the health decisions investigated. In
total, 26 participants were interviewed, including both
government representatives as well as individuals repre-
senting influential stakeholders in the policy process,
particularly from aid providers, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), multi-lateral organisations and
local research institutes.
IDI guidelines focused on broad topics, which were
tailored to the different roles of informants and the
specific expertise or insights they would bring; these
were (1) perceptions about the policy process, including
the role of different actors and contextual factors, (2) the
nature and source of evidence that was used to inform
the policy decision, (3) the way in which evidence was
presented and evaluated, and (4) general views on insti-
tutional structures and practices of evidence use within
the Cambodian health sector. Interviews were conducted
face-to-face by the authors, recorded (if permission was
given), and subsequently transcribed and coded into
themes in an iterative process [34]. Citations from inter-
views and documents are included in the presentation of
results to illustrate key points and emerging themes.
Consent was obtained at the initiation of each inter-
view, with respondents given options on levels of ano-
nymity desired. Ethical approval to undertake the study
was provided by the London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine and research permission was obtained
from the Cambodia National Ethical Committee for
Health Research (n. 0120; 06/05/2014).
Policy study perspectives
It is now reasonably well-established that national policy
contexts can vary considerably with important implica-
tions for evidence use. Yet, even within a single country,
the characteristics of evidence use for different health
issues may also vary considerably. Previous work has
made it clear that the political nature of policy-making
means that there can be multiple competing interests
and concerns at stake for any given policy decision –
even within the health sector [7, 35, 36]. This indicates
that multiple pieces of evidence may be relevant or con-
sidered in the policy process, depending on the differing
concerns at stake, rather than any single piece or body
of evidence. Thus, an important step in moving beyond
an over-simplistic treatment of evidence use is to under-
stand the differing interests of stakeholders holding
varying power and influence over a given policy deci-
sion. Indeed, Cairney [7] notes that there can be such
contestation at each step of the policy process – from
defining the problem, to deciding which evidence to
generate (or presumably which evidence to consider),
to choosing solutions.
Scholars have thus begun to apply a range of theories
and concepts from the policy sciences to help deepen
our understanding of evidence use given these realities.
Pearce [37], for instance, describes a ‘mistaken consen-
sus’ that local climate policy can be based on emissions
data, instead drawing out how ideas and arguments are
also used, and needed, to construct local policy
responses. This view is similar to that of Wellstead et al.
[38], who argue that climate change adaptation science
advocates are too narrowly functionalist in assuming
that policies will change in response to feedback
about climate change. Instead, they argue that under-
standing policy changes in this area requires looking
not just at the specific problems climate science
identifies, “but also at the political and institutional
factors that transform situations into problems and
attempt to address them” ([38], p. 13).
This shift away from thinking about policy problems
as fixed, but instead to consider how issues become ‘pro-
blematised’, directly draws on the field of interpretive (or
critical) policy studies, which considers the roles of rhet-
oric or discursive framing in shaping policy outcomes
(c.f. [39–41]). It is not just climate science, however,
which has seen such developments in analysis. In look-
ing at health policy, Smith [13], for example, argues that
it is the roles and interplay of ideas (and ideas about
evidence) that can be critical to understand evidence use
within differing health-related concerns.
The policy sciences have thus been increasingly
applied to questions of evidence use in health policy-
making and beyond. These perspectives allow consider-
ation of the multiple interests and multiple bodies of
evidence that are important to a policy decision, while
further recognising the ways that institutional and idea-
tional factors can lead to differing constructions of what
evidence is seen to be appropriate to address any given
interest in the first place – with institutional forms and
ideas closely linked to the relative influence of different
stakeholders in policy processes.
In this paper, we embrace this approach, applying
ideas from new institutionalism to explore the compet-
ing or contrasting constructions of evidence use for a set
of three differing health policy concerns in the setting of
Cambodia. On the one hand, new institutionalism high-
lights not just the structures in place that shape decision-
making processes and outcomes, but also the importance
of rules and norms within organisations that guide actor
behaviours or decisions [18, 42]. The approach also expands
the focus of analysis beyond classic comparisons of state
bureaucracies or legislative forms to consider the nature of
institutionalised forces directing policy-relevant action
across a much wider set of organisational forms, including
non-state bodies, collections of stakeholders or contrasting
elements within a government system.
Applying such an approach to the question of evidence
use for health thus allows us to focus on multiple issues.
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First, we can consider the power or influence that differ-
ent stakeholders have over policy processes based on
their structural positions for a given policy issue –
reflecting on how different bodies of evidence may be
more or less relevant to given stakeholders with influ-
ence. However, this approach also allows exploration of
the institutional logics which those stakeholders possess
(c.f. [43, 44]) that further shape the use and understand-
ing of policy-relevant evidence. In order to achieve these
goals, we first provide an overview of the three policy
areas addressed, followed by a description of the types of
evidence seen to be applied or important in each case. This
is then followed by our analytical section that applies this
institutional and ideational lens to explore such questions.
Results
One country, three health policy issues
Tobacco control
Tobacco smoking became increasingly prevalent in
Cambodia in the 1990s when the country was recovering
from its civil war. At this time, there emerged the pres-
ence of many transnational tobacco companies in the
country, the most prominent of which was British
American Tobacco (BAT). The need for foreign invest-
ment and the lack of regulation of advertising at this
time were explicitly recognised by BAT, who described
Cambodia as “an attractive and strategically important
target” [45]. A 1993 BAT industry plan, for example,
acknowledged that awareness of the relationship be-
tween smoking and morbidity/mortality would increase
in Cambodia through the activities of WHO, but esti-
mated that “the significant revenues generated by tobacco
advertising [for the government] will, in the short term,
delay anti-smoking initiatives until alternative forms of
revenue are guaranteed” [45]. BAT’s preferred option
was reportedly to become a majority shareholder in a
joint venture alongside local interests. Such an arrange-
ment would presumably allow industry control of the
composition of the company board of directors and
significant influence over corporation activities, whilst
also encouraging a local stake in the corporation’s
success. BAT achieved this in 1995 [45].
According to Mackenzie et al. [45] there was also, at this
time, owing to the lack of regulation, huge scope for
tobacco-control advertising and promotional activities.
Indeed, a 1994 survey of 12 main streets in the country’s
capital Phnom Penh recorded that 49% of the advertising
signs (8495 in total) were advertising tobacco products [46].
HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS in Cambodia has a very different history to
tobacco smoking. In the mid-1990s, Cambodia had one
of the fastest growing HIV prevalence rates in Southeast
Asia, with injecting drug use and commercial sex driving
HIV transmission [47]. Adult prevalence peaked at
approximately 2.0% in 1998 [48]. However, since then, a
number of prevention and treatment programmes have
been introduced and the country’s prevalence had
reduced to an estimated 0.7% in 2013 [49, 50].
The response has been divided into three phases. In
phase I (1991–2000), a nationwide HIV prevention
programme targeted brothel-based sex work, introduc-
tion of voluntary confidential counselling and testing,
and home-based care, and peer support groups of people
living with HIV emerged. Phase II (2001–2011) was
characterised by expanding antiretroviral treatment
(covering more than 80% of the population) and
continuity of care, linking with other health services,
accelerated prevention among key populations at higher
risk (entertainment establishment-based sex workers,
men who have sex with men, transgender persons, and
people who inject drugs), engagement of health workers
to deliver quality services, and strengthening health
service delivery systems. Finally, phase 3 (2012–2020)
aims to attain zero new infections by 2020 through
sharpening responses to high-risk population groups,
maximising access to community and facility-based
testing and retention in prevention and care, and accel-
erating the transition from vertical approaches to linked/
integrated approaches [50]. In recognition of the coun-
try’s success in halting and reversing the spread of HIV
(relating to the United Nations Millennium Development
Goal (MDG) 6), Cambodia was presented in 2010 with an
MDG Award [51].
PBF and the case of the GMIS
The final health issue we explored in relation to the use of
evidence was that of PBF, with specific discussion in the in-
terviews about the role of evidence in supporting the
GMIS. In many low- and middle-income countries, PBF is
increasingly being used to redress particular aspects of
health system underperformance, particularly the product-
ivity and quality of healthcare providers. It involves offering
incentives intended to redress underperformance, particu-
larly high worker absenteeism, which is frequently observed
in poorly funded public health systems with poor account-
ability [52]. Support for PBF has spread rapidly in many
countries in recent years [52]. However, whilst there is con-
siderable enthusiasm for PBF policies, according to a
Cochrane Collaboration review [53] of pay-for-performance
to improve the delivery of health interventions in low-
and middle-income countries, the current evidence
base is too weak to draw any general conclusions
regarding effectiveness, with more robust and compre-
hensive studies being needed.
According to van der Poel et al. [52], Cambodia was
the first documented case of a low-income country to
experiment with PBF of public healthcare. Since 1999, a
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variety of health programme funding of districts and
facilities in Cambodia have been contingent on perform-
ance targets or have directly linked revenues to services
delivered. The main PBF programmes implemented have
specified performance targets relating to child vaccination,
antenatal care, delivery in a public facility, and birth
spacing [52]. These funding arrangements have been
intended to increase aspects of healthcare provision, and
there has been considerable variation in the strength and
conditions of the incentives offered [52].
The interviewees specifically identified the GMIS as a
notable PBF policy, and described how the policy
contributed to reducing Cambodia’s high maternal
mortality ratio over recent years. The GMIS became
operational nationwide in late 2007, following a joint
prakas (directive) from the MoH and Ministry of Economy
and Finance (MEF) to allocate government budget to the
incentive payments [54]. The UNFPA was considered to be
behind the policy change, for example, through supporting
a High-Level Midwifery Forum in late 2005 that brought
together representatives from several government depart-
ments. However, it was the prime minister who reportedly
‘gave the green light’ for the policy to go ahead. Other
stakeholders were not thought to have had much direct
influence over this decision, and the Cambodian Midwives
Council, for example, was established after the implementa-
tion of the GMIS.
The GMIS aimed to boost facility deliveries by motivat-
ing skilled birth attendants (or trained health personnel)
to promote deliveries in public health facilities. It did this
by providing midwives (and other trained personnel) cash
incentives based on the number of live births they
attended in public health facilities, with US$ 15 for a live
birth in a health centre and US$ 10 for a live birth in a
referral hospital. The reason for the higher payment in a
health centre than a hospital was to provide a stronger
incentive for deliveries at health centres – the recom-
mended facility for normal deliveries to be managed [55].
According to the MoH’s guidance, besides midwives,
physicians and other trained health personnel can also
receive these incentives when attending deliveries in public
health facilities. Up to 30% of the incentives will be shared
with other health personnel in the facility and eventually
with other people, such as traditional birth attendants,
who refer women to the facility for delivery [54]. The
number of deliveries is reported monthly by health
facilities through the routine health information
system. Based on the number of reported deliveries,
incentives are disbursed quarterly to the facilities
through public financial disbursement channels [54].
The nature of evidence used
In this section, we begin to describe and examine the
reported differences in evidence use between the three
policy areas. The evidence relating to each issue can be
categorised in various ways, including by evidence topic
(e.g. health, economic) or type (e.g. epidemiological, pilot
study), which relate to the issue framing by key stake-
holders, and the sources relied upon (e.g. global litera-
ture, national statistics, government survey). What is
clear, however, is that no single uniform construction of
policy-relevant evidence was seen across cases.
Tobacco control
Global evidence on tobacco harms were at this time
considered well established, but local data on smoking
rates were fairly limited. In the late 1990s, Cambodia
had some small regional surveys of smoking prevalence,
but it was not until 2005 that accurate nationwide preva-
lence data on tobacco use was available [56]. In spite of
a lack of local data on smoking, in May 2004 Cambodia
signed the FCTC, a global policy agreement that calls
for a number of restrictions on tobacco advertising and
promotion – restrictions which many global health
authors present as ‘evidence based’ [57–59]. Many stake-
holders interviewed noted the importance of the FCTC
locally, as it dictated that the government could not
engage with industry on developing tobacco control
policy. However, implementation of the elements of the
convention were described as only occurring slowly or
in limited ways, which interviewees suggested was due
to industry influence.
For example, one independent health sector consultant
explained:
“The tobacco industry and lobby is massively powerful
here.” (IDI-01, June 2014)
Another respondent, a senior civil servant in the
MoH, explained:
“We don’t know exactly why the law is very slow to
be approved. Probably this is also due to lobbying
of tobacco corporations, but we don’t have evidence
to prove it.” (IDI-10, August 2014)
This individual also noted that tobacco control did not
appear to be a priority in the national health sector
strategic plan.
The context of a deeply entrenched and powerful to-
bacco interest was also manifested in how respondents
conceptualised the evidence that was relevant for mov-
ing tobacco control policies forward. For example, a
number of civil servants interviewed stressed the need
to counter other evidence that the tobacco industry uses
to frame tobacco control in a way that suits industry
interests. For example:
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“They [tobacco corporations] always complain that if
we increase taxes, farmers will lose their job. So, you
have to explain to the government that, if you increase
taxes, the margin will not affect the industry. Also, we
have to explain that farmers do not rely on one crop only,
so reduced tobacco production will not significantly affect
them.” (IDI-06, June 2014)
“Tobacco industry is powerful and has money. Some
people are lobbied by tobacco corporations. They
[tobacco corporations] have a lot of experience. They
can approach friends or members of the family and get
confidential information about policy making. Then,
people that are lobbied create opposition at the
inter-ministerial meetings. They often say that tobacco
control will impact on the economy and farmers.”
(IDI-08, August 2014)
Respondents also emphasised the importance of
making different evidence-based arguments to different
actors. In particular, it was noted that the MEF needed
different evidence from that required by the MoH
regarding tobacco control to try to convince it to
support policy action. As one civil servant explained:
“You have to find a way to convince people… also
because policy is multisectoral. It’s not that one minister
decides. If you want to increase tax, this is not an issue
of the Ministry of Health. We don’t have the power to do
this. We can do a smoke-free policy, but tax is under the
Ministry of Finance. So you have to work closely with
the Ministry of Finance. In Cambodia, when you talk to
the Ministry of Finance, first you have you prove to them
they can make more money… The industry can say ‘oh
if you increase taxes, you will lose revenue’. And you
have to present evidence that increasing taxes is not a
loss of revenue.” (IDI-06, June 2014)
“We explain to the government that an increase in tax
does not change the overall volume of cigarettes that
are sold in the market. The case of Thailand shows
this. Why? Because smoking prevalence decreases, but
population increases. Cambodia is the same. Smoking
prevalence has gone from 49.6% to 42.6%, however the
absolute number of smoking is always 2 million
because population increased… and you have to tell
the government these facts. So you have to do a lot of
work with the government to prove this. And of course,
the tobacco industry makes a lot of money. We cannot
stop them.” (IDI-06, June 2014)
This civil servant also explained how evidence from
neighbouring countries was considered influential, as
was the normative element of the FCTC.
“Usually in Cambodia we present evidence or
examples from ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations] countries. How is Vietnam doing?
Thailand? Indonesia? Then, we also do international.
But ASEAN is very important, also because we are
approaching the ASEAN [Economic] Community in
2015, and member countries do not want to be left
behind.” (IDI-06, June 2014).
Overall, whilst many of the respondents spoke of the
slow progress of tobacco control policy in Cambodia,
the government has made substantial progress in
tobacco control by banning the advertisement of tobacco
products in 2011 as well as banning smoking in work-
places and public spaces in 2016 using sub-decrees.
However, it was not until April 2015 that the Cambodian
National Assembly passed the country’s first-ever law on
tobacco control, which was ratified later the same
month. The new law tackles tobacco from a variety of
angles, including through import and sales restrictions,
and bans on sales to minors and pregnant women [60].
HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS policy-making illustrates a radically different
political context in which the utilisation of health policy-
relevant evidence can be explored. UNAIDS has stated that
Cambodia has “used high-quality strategic information to
inform a [successful] evidence-based response” [61], and
interviews stood in dramatic contrast to those with stake-
holders advocating for greater tobacco control who
expressed the need to develop or discuss evidence of
financial impact (e.g. on farmers or the treasury) to
justify policy action. Instead, in discussions of HIV/
AIDS, whilst a variety of evidence types were clearly
brought to bear, NGO and donor-organisation respon-
dents discussed how it has often been epidemiological
modelling and cost-effectiveness analyses (IDI-21, May
2016) – forms of evidence more typically advocated by
public health actors for priority setting – that were seen as
important evidence to guide policy. One of the respon-
dents spoke about how this approach should be replicated
in other areas of health policy-making:
“I would say for HIV/AIDS it’s that way [evidence use
is more technical than in other areas of policy] every
time. I feel like that’s brilliant and the model of HIV/
AIDS [should] be replicated to other diseases, for
example, we still have a very high number of deaths
among pregnant women, the baby, the infant. So
why don’t they learn from the HIV/AIDS program.”
(IDI-21, May 2016)
When interviewees were asked about the use of
evidence within particular policy developments, a range
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of evidence types were described in addition to the
epidemiological modelling and cost-effectiveness studies
mentioned above. Other relevant evidence was said to
include pilot studies, used, for example, to inform the
development of a community-based testing approach
implemented in 2013, where the HIV testing is
performed by lay counsellors – volunteers from popula-
tion groups at higher risk of HIV infection. National
prevalence estimates and international evidence were
also evidence types that were frequently mentioned,
particularly with international evidence from other
Southeast Asian countries, and particularly Thailand.
The importance of international evidence may also
reflect the strong role of donors in HIV/AIDS policy-
making in Cambodia.
“Yes they [policy-makers] welcome [overseas evidence]
in the HIV area. I don’t know about the other area.
They welcome to learn the best practice from the
region. This week one [NGO] staff member. He joined
the field in Bangkok.” (IDI-20, May 2016)
Epidemiological modelling of future prevalence scenarios
has been considered key to informing policy with regards
to the prioritisation and targeting of interventions, prepar-
ation of operational plans, budgets and resource mobilisa-
tion efforts [11, 12]. Further, cost-effectiveness analyses,
such as modelling, have highlighted areas where technical
efficiency might be improved. The National Centre for
HIV/AIDS, Dermatology and STI (NCHADS) within
Cambodia’s MoH, which is responsible for the health
sector response to HIV and other sexually transmitted
diseases, has led the analysis, in collaboration with
relevant departments and centres of the MoH, the
National AIDS Authority and other government institu-
tions, as well as health service providers, NGOs, and other
civil society organisations and development partners.
When asked about the reasons why HIV/AIDS policy-
making stood out in terms of the use of what is more
typically considered policy-relevant health evidence,
respondents particularly spoke of the strong donor inter-
est and support for HIV policy-making in Cambodia. They
felt that this was key to driving the type of evidence being
used in policy-making, and also the relatively well-
functioning institutional entry points for such evidence,
including the relevant technical working groups (TWGs)
of the MoH. One NGO respondent explained:
“Yes it’s different [the policy-making process for HIV/
AIDS compared to that for other health issues]. I
think this is because donor support, and I think the other
thing is because of resource, donor support and resource.
Resource, I would say financial resource and human
capacity resource, let’s say for HIV/AIDS they have more
educated [staff] and they adhere to plan, they adhere to
target and they target evidence and I feel like the
government take that approach very well, participatory
approach, it’s very well, because it’s an emergency
situation but it is also in the situation where funding
is allowing so that’s why we feel like they are open.”
(IDI-21, May 2016)
However, there were downsides to a donor-driven
approach also described, including in relation to siloed,
non-integrated evidence gathering. When asked what
could be improved, one interviewee explained:
“Well I think it’s coordination. Because there’s
basically the different donor programme, donors put
all the evidence together. It sits on programmes that
are… like some donors who are actually doing their
own evidence, but not systematically led by the
national programme and disseminated in a timely
manner.” (IDI-19, May 2016)
Interestingly, while HIV/AIDS policy-making has at
times been seen as controversial or contested in some
countries, related to the highly stigmatised nature of
HIV transmission in some contexts [62, 63], we found
little evidence of this in Cambodia. Whilst stigma and
discrimination towards groups at higher risk of infection
(sex workers, men who have sex with men, transgender
persons and people who inject drugs) were noted, these
were perceived to be relatively low compared to that in
many countries elsewhere. Instead, one of the NGO
respondents explained that, in Cambodia, policy-
makers are relatively open – and increasingly so – to
discussing these groups and considering evidence
relating to these groups.
“The policy-makers they are more open now… for
HIV the policy-maker they are more open and learn
from the [experience of high-risk groups].”
(IDI-20, May 2016)
The respondents from a key NGO also spoke at
length about the effort made by the NGO to engage
high-risk population groups in the policy-making
process, particularly with regards to supporting repre-
sentatives to speak at community meetings and at the
MoH TWG meetings.
“[The NGO] work to promote that involvement in the
policy-making as well, not only [the NGO] but also
civil society. But we try to involve the key representatives
from each key population to enrol in the policy-making
process… we use the number, we use the finding, we use
the civil society. But also bring the key population to talk
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during the meeting is more powerful… So this is like an
MSM [men who have sex with men] person or a sex
worker, an entertainment worker could stand and
speak about their challenges and the law enforcement
people they listen to this. They’re part of the meeting.
Everyone is part of the meeting… They also listen and
sometimes they [describe] their challenges and you can
see some improvement.” (IDI-20, May 2016)
PBF and the case of the GMIS
In contrast to the evidence types seen as relevant for
tobacco control and HIV/AIDS policy-making, when
asked about evidence for policy-making in regard to PBF
schemes generally, these schemes were described as reli-
ant almost solely on evidence from pilot studies. Inter-
view respondents spoke of various pilot schemes of PBF
that had been run over the years in different districts
and by different groups, often by NGOs, but also in
workplaces of NCHADS. The perceived dominance of
pilots as an evidence type is likely due to specific PBF
policies being scaled up based on a pilot, but such
schemes are likely also informed by evidence from
health economics more broadly (and indeed, from basic
microeconomics) that incentives can achieve out-
comes [64]. When pushed for further examples of
evidence use in the PBF area, some respondents men-
tioned evidence from the Demographic and Health
Survey, and also international evidence as informing
the use of such schemes; however, respondents did
not provide specific examples of such evidence. Some
mentioned the low payment of midwives and the lack
of incentives for women to deliver in health facilities
as evidence for needed change.
“I don’t think anyone guided the government to design
that policy. But it came clearly from many dialogues
that the pay was not enough, that the arrangements
did not encourage midwives to work in remote health
centres, and did not encourage mothers to use health
facilities.” (IDI-11, June 2014)
“A few years ago there was a policy to put one midwife
in each health centre and the midwifery incentive…
Hun Sen acted on this, and the policy was implemented
immediately and very effectively… the trigger was the
Demographic and Health Survey… it has quite a bit of
impact, and there was a lot of pressure from the
international community… it was a relatively ‘easy fix’,
a simple solution.” (IDI-12, June 2014)
However, the dominance of pilots as an evidence type
fits with observations from van de Poel et al. [52], as
stated above, of Cambodia’s pioneering role in experi-
menting with PBF of public healthcare, and also with
one of our respondent’s description of Cambodia as “a
country of pilots” (IDI-23, May 2016).
In contrast, however, there was also considerable
discussion of the fact that, at times, policy directives come
from high levels of government – within the MoH or as a
decision made by the Prime Minister himself – and that, in
such situations, evidence is perceived to be of limited im-
portance. The GMIS was described as an example of this:
“That [the GMIS] was an example of policy being
changed by the government. It’s the government’s job,
without any evidence.” (IDI-15, May 2016)
“You know, in the United States the evidence has, as
far as can tell, no effect on congress. But what happens
is they pass laws and then health and human services
when they’re putting out the regulations or something,
that’s where the evidence comes in. Here it’s more like
everything at the congress level, even there is no, it
doesn’t get more rational as it comes down through the
MoH… People have very set ideas about things and
those aren’t going to change no matter what evidence
is put in front of them.” (IDI-22, May 2016)
“You can present the evidence and present it
passionately and you can present it unanimously
when you are heard, but there’s never really a
proper policy dialogue. So saying well I could go
and speak to the Ministry of Economy and Finance
about that, we need extra money or we need to
look at the budgets or perhaps we need to revise the
[pre-service] training curriculum. You don’t get
that.” (IDI-15, May 2016)
“We don’t even know who made it. There’s a re-writing
of history that claims the MoH thought about it but
there was no evidence. I was here right after it started
and know many people here when it started. At the time
no-one was claiming the MoH invented it, so it came
out of the MEF, the Ministry of Economy and Finance. It
was actually hugely successful.” (IDI-22, May 2016)
Another respondent from a donor agency was unable
to name evidence in support of the policy, and instead
described how he saw the policy process for the GMIS.
“I think in Cambodia evidence [is not so important,
rather the] government want the community to deliver
their baby at the health facility so the government just
simply providing incentive to the health staff,
community wide, so for delivery of one live birth
delivery, they get US$15.00 this is the decision by
the government and government budget and then
see if they implemented that.” (IDI-17, May 2016)
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This perception of success appears to come from data
showing increasing facility utilisation for delivery and
falling mortality rates nationally after implementation of
the programme. Since then, the percentage of deliveries
in public health facilities has increased substantially,
from 29% in 2006 to 57% in 2011, and the maternal
mortality ratio has declined substantially from 473 per
100,000 live births in 2005 to 206 in 2010 [54]. Care, of
course, is needed with interpretation of such evidence. A
number of evaluations of PBF schemes such as the
GMIS have been undertaken, and PBF policies have been
credited with developments, including increasing utilisa-
tion by the poor, decreasing total family per capita
health expenditure and encouraging better management
[65], but drawing firm conclusions of causality can be
problematic, particularly when such programmes have
been implemented alongside other health sector reforms
[66]. One respondent further commented that the
quality of evaluations undertaken is often poor.
Institutional features and logics of evidence use
The three policy areas presented show few similarities in
how pieces of evidence were used in various aspects of
policy-making, despite all being discussed or undertaken
within a single MoH, and within a broad policy environ-
ment in which ‘evidence-based policy-making’ is rhet-
orically championed. In this section, however, we draw
out some of the particular institutional and ideational
features of the three health policy concerns that may
help to explain these findings.
A starting point is to compare the institutionalised
positions of influence of the key stakeholders in each
case in order to reflect on how the relevance of particu-
lar evidence types fit with the interests of such stake-
holders. This can then be followed by considering any
contrasting institutional logics that similarly might help
explain differences in evidence utilisation. Such logics
could either be direct thinking about which evidence is
relevant and why (such as how public health actors
explicitly embrace hierarchies of evidence at times), or
they may be related to the overarching goals or expecta-
tions of the actors involved, which subsequently shapes
their uses of evidence (such as when particular types of
evidence more naturally align with or fit broader goals).
In the case of tobacco control, the historical influence
of the tobacco industry appears particularly relevant,
and the nature of contestation for this issue appeared to
be principally framed in terms of financial implications
of tobacco control. Our respondents described the finan-
cial importance of tobacco for the agricultural sector
and the national economy as the paramount concerns
for any policy change. Tobacco control advocates are
well aware of the need to present different evidence and
frame the issue differently to address the concerns of the
most influential stakeholders, with a particular distinction
made between the health and economic evidence needed
when speaking to policy-makers from the MoH and MEF,
respectively. The need for taxation and other regulatory
policy to be made outside the MoH illustrated how
limited health-related evidence of tobacco harms could be
in driving tobacco control policy forward on its own.
Evidence from neighbouring countries, and the FCTC,
were said to be influential. However, even so, and despite
considerable progress, policy change in line with these
was described as particularly slow, as too was the devel-
opment of what were considered more appropriate
forms of evidence to guide tobacco policy from a public
health perspective such as national smoking prevalence
surveys. Despite global evidence on tobacco harms and
increasing local data on smoking, it was the concerns
regarding economic growth and the industry’s entrenched
interests and lobbying documented in our study and else-
where [45, 67, 68] that dominated the agenda. As such,
this significantly appeared to slow down the translation of
the FCTC into local tobacco control policies as well as the
collection of, or action based on, forms of evidence typic-
ally seen as relevant to health promotion.
In contrast, the HIV/AIDS policy response in
Cambodia developed in a rather different political con-
text. With HIV/AIDS, there was no establishment of
corporate interests and little obvious financial interest at
stake for any major stakeholders. Instead, the issue may
have achieved a relatively high level of priority for policy
action in Cambodia due to the attention and resources
this issue has been afforded by donor agencies and, pos-
sibly related to this, the well-functioning TWGs of the
MoH for HIV policy-making, as described by our
respondents. The institutionalisation of donor influence
is, in fact, reflected within the country’s various strategic
documents for guiding programme implementation,
including the National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS
2011–2015 and Cambodia 3.0, a strategy developed by
the country’s MoH to eliminate new HIV infections
and congenital syphilis by 2020. Both are considered
to be in line with the global targets and foci estab-
lished by UNAIDS and the US PEPFAR programme
(from which Cambodia is a recipient of funds) [49,
69]. However, these are highly technical global policy
agencies that routinely promote, or operate based
around, particular forms of evidence types, embracing
international discourses of evidence-based policy-
making. This may translate to the Cambodian con-
text, particularly since there were no other strong
interest groups to present alternative rhetoric or
framing around the issue, and as such may have led
to the use of evidence types in Cambodia more typic-
ally advocated by public health advocates in HIV/
AIDS policy-making, as well as the observation by
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one NGO respondent that the National HIV/AIDS
Centre is “big on evidence” (IDI-25, May 2016).
Indeed, while in many countries the issue of HIV testing
has been subject to debate or controversy, particularly
around issues of disclosure or confidentiality of people
living with HIV, and the challenges associated with
addressing HIV in often stigmatised groups such as men
who have sex with men, transgender people and sex
workers, these concerns were considered by our respon-
dents to have been relatively unimportant in Cambodia
(even if admittedly seen as sensitive). That HIV/AIDS is
an issue with social connotations in Cambodia perhaps
explains the use of narrative evidence – stories of the
lived experiences of marginalised groups – to influ-
ence policy-making. However, the relatively low level
of moral contestation for this issue in Cambodia was
noted and used to explain the recent introduction of
community-based rapid HIV testing (so-called ‘finger-
prick testing’) by lay volunteer counsellors for high-
risk population groups. Within this recent national
policy, however, it was again evidence of effectiveness
provided from a pilot study that could be seen to
lead to policy change [70, 71].
Nevertheless, the importance of pilots was much more
apparent, and described as the primary source of policy-
relevant evidence for PBF. This was in contrast to
tobacco policy appearing to require discussion of
evidence of financial impact (linked to the influence of
one set of interest groups), and HIV policy drawing
particularly on epidemiological models and surveys (in
line with norms and expectations of global health agen-
cies). Again, we can look to the most influential stake-
holders involved and their institutional logics to help
explain the emphasis on pilots as a form of evidence in
this case. Indeed, this helps to move away from the often
criticised over-reliance on the idea that a single hier-
archy of evidence can guide policy decisions, to instead
consider the policy ‘appropriateness’ of particular forms
of evidence [72–74].
Unlike the previous cases, the GMIS policy appears to
have had few stakeholders outside the government itself.
It was reportedly made from the highest levels of the
government, with some interviewees speculating that it
was driven by the Prime Minister’s office in particular in
response to a feeling that some action must be taken to
help achieve the maternal health MDG by 2015. The
power and influence in this case appeared to be particu-
larly hierarchical, with decision-making made through a
planning and management orientation. Pilot studies,
which examine feasibility of an intervention, are a first
step in exploring novel interventions, novel applications
of an intervention, or the feasibility of an intervention in
a particular context when the effectiveness of that inter-
vention may be context dependent [75]. For this reason,
they are often considered important evidence of effect-
iveness as well as feasibility within a particular context
and for complex interventions, on the premise that cul-
tural appropriateness of interventions is important and
can shape outcomes [76]. As such, pilot studies have
been described previously as particularly applicable in
health services and health systems research [77], but
they also could be seen to be particularly relevant when
a government has decided that wide-scale implementa-
tion of an intervention is a primary objective such as
achieving an MDG target through reducing the high
maternal mortality rate.
In Table 1 we present a summary of these findings. In
particular, we highlight the stakeholders established to
have dominant influence in each policy case, and their
institutional interests and logics that help to explain the
evidence said to be used by our interviewees.
Discussion
Despite a common use of the language of evidence-
based policy-making in the health sector, there are in
fact many types of evidence that can speak to a variety
of political concerns and mandates that play out in the
policy process. Sometimes evidence use differs because
Table 1 Characterisation of the institutional and ideational factors related to the health policy issue
Health policy area Established dominant
stakeholders
Institutional interests
and logics
Nature of evidence used
Types Topic Source
Tobacco control Industry, Ministry of
Economy and Finance
Financial importance of
tobacco for agriculture
sector and national
economy
- Regional surveys
- Epidemiological
- Economic
- Health
- Health
- Finance
- Local government,
- Global repositories
- Local sources
HIV/AIDS International donors Hierarchy of evaluation
evidence; importance of
achieving global targets
- Epidemiological
- Economic
- Pilot studies
- Narrative
- Health
- Finance
- Health
- Social
- Global, local sources
- Local sources
- Local sources
- Citizens
Performance-based
financing – Government
Midwifery Incentive
Scheme
Ministry of Health,
Ministry of Economy and
Finance, Prime Minister
Importance of achieving
global targets; importance
of achieving national
implementation
- Pilot studies
- Epidemiological
- Health
- Health
- Local (government, NGO)
- Local sources
Walls et al. Health Research Policy and Systems  (2017) 15:95 Page 10 of 13
the evidence needs vary in order to solve an agreed upon
problem. At other times however, there may not be any
agreement on the nature of the problem, and as such it
is the features of power, interests and framing that serve
as important drivers shaping which evidence informs
policy considerations. An institutional approach can help
to understand some of these dynamics. It can identify
which stakeholders have established positions of
power within differing health policy issues, linking
their interests to the nature of evidence used. It can
also help reflect on the institutional logics of these
stakeholders which may further influence when or
how evidence is utilised.
For tobacco, large and expensive national prevalence
surveys were considered necessary evidence for inter-
vention, even given considerable evidence from smaller
studies of a high prevalence of smoking in the country,
and the irrefutable global evidence linking tobacco to
numerous diseases and mortality. However, such surveys
were needed because of a demand for evidence that
could speak to the dominant concerns of financial
impact and the logic that evidence was needed to illustrate
economic impact, rather than any public health logic of
evidence to show medical harm to the population. The
importance of the MEF is thus apparent in this case – il-
lustrating both its dominant policy concern in terms of
the economy, but also its logic of what forms of evidence
are required to speak to that concern. Furthermore, it is of
course critical to understand the historical influence and
role of the tobacco industry in the country, which no
doubt has played an important role in shifting the terms
of tobacco policy to one of revenue.
In contrast, for the case of HIV/AIDS, the dominance
of global donors in supporting this health issue, and the
apparent limited contestation at a local level, appears to
have led to the explicit embrace of epidemiological
evidence that is widely held to be appropriate for HIV
planning within the global health community. However,
in the final case of PBF, it was the government that
drove both the initiation and implementation of the
policy response. This state-controlled process appeared
to reflect a belief that national action must be taken to
address an existing priority (in the form of a MDG).
This, in turn, naturally led to a logic which saw relatively
small studies focussed on implementation to be the most
relevant to policy. Although it is worth noting that, in
the case of the GMIS, some believed that evidence was
not perceived as important at all due to the policy being
driven by higher level political authorities. Indeed, some
stakeholders simply referred to the GMIS policy when
asked for a good example of the use of evidence, since it
was national action based around the ‘evidence’ that ma-
ternal mortality rates were too high. This is a much sim-
pler logic of evidence-informed policy-making, whereby
evidence of a problem is seen to justify widespread
action, in contrast to more traditional health sector
descriptions of evidence use being concerned with the
effectiveness of interventions or possible alternative
priorities or approaches.
Policy studies scholars would not be surprised that
powerful stakeholders (or ‘vested interests’) end up shaping
the understanding of evidence, or which pieces of evidence
are championed as relevant for policy-making. This is
perhaps most clearly illustrated in how evidence has been
presented or selected by the tobacco industry in relation to
policy-making debates (c.f. [27, 28, 78, 79]). For example,
tobacco industry-funded studies have been shown to have
misrepresented the association between second-hand
smoke and cardiovascular diseases [27], or the evidence in
support of standardised packaging of tobacco products
[79]. Tobacco interests have also emphasised evidence in
support of the economic contributions of their product,
whilst questioning the evidence suggesting that policy
interventions are needed to protect health [78]. HIV/
AIDS, on the other hand, touches on issues of gender
and sexuality, drug use and sex work, which often
leads to it being seen as a highly morally contested
issue. However, these did not appear particularly
relevant in Cambodia, serving as a reminder that we
cannot assume a health topic will necessarily exhibit
the same political characteristics in different settings,
even if such features are commonplace in other cases.
Conclusions
In the three contrasting case studies of evidence use in
health policy-making examined in this study, evidence
types – and their framing – were found to differ greatly,
despite them taking place in the same country setting.
The findings reiterate past authors’ understandings that
‘evidence’ is not a uniform concept for which more is
obviously better, or where a single model of ‘evidence-
based policy-making’ can prevail, but rather that differ-
ent constructions and pieces of evidence become
relevant given the politics involved in policy decisions,
the nature of institutions involved, and the framing and
conceptualisations of the issues themselves. Our com-
parative analysis helps to begin to trace out themes in
linkages between the nature of contestation of health
issues, the interests of established dominant stake-
holders, and the logics by which those stakeholders
operate – all of which work to shape which evidence is
utilised or seen as policy relevant to inform health deci-
sions. Whilst considerable further empirical research is
needed in this area, this more nuanced understanding of
evidence use may be of relevance to health policy-
makers and others considering how to improve the role
of evidence in health policy-making.
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